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We evaluate the net benefits of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) for shareholders by studying the lobbying
behavior of investors and corporate insiders to affect the final implemented rules under the Act. Investors
lobbied overwhelmingly in favor of strict implementation of SOX, while corporate insiders and business
groups lobbied against strict implementation. We identify the firms most affected by the law as those
whose insiders lobbied against strict implementation, and compare their returns to the returns of less
affected firms. Cumulative returns during the four and a half months leading up to passage of SOX
were approximately 10 percent higher for corporations whose insiders lobbied against one or more
of the SOX disclosure-related provisions than for similar non-lobbying firms. Analysis of returns in
the post-passage implementation period indicates that investors' positive expectations with regards
to the effects of the law were warranted for the enhanced disclosure provisions of SOX.
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a-vissing@northwestern.eduFollowing the Enron/Arthur Andersen scandal in late 2001, the U.S. Congress came under increas-
ing pressure to pass legislation that would make it more diﬃcult and costly for corporate insiders
to misrepresent company performance and divert resources for personal gain. Bills were introduced
in the House by Representative Michael Oxley on February 13, 2002, and in the Senate by Senator
Paul Sarbanes on May 8, 2002. The ﬁnal bill, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, was passed in the
House and Senate on July 25, 2002.
There are two main competing views about the likely impact of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX)
on shareholders. Proponents of the Act argue that it will lead to improved disclosure and corporate
governance, thereby reducing misconduct of insiders, and that these beneﬁts will outweigh the costs
of compliance. Opponents argue either that SOX will be ineﬀective in preventing corporate wrong-
doing and/or that any beneﬁts of SOX will not be large enough to outweigh the compliance costs
associated with it.
The central challenge to distinguishing between the two main views regarding the eﬀect of
SOX is the lack of a control group of publicly traded ﬁrms unaﬀected by the legislation. In this
paper, we employ two approaches in an attempt to circumvent the lack of a control group of
comparable ﬁrms unaﬀected by SOX. Our methodology follows from the procedural process used
in the implementation of the SOX legislation.
Following the passage of SOX in 2002, Congress delegated the drafting and implementation of
the principles outlined by SOX to the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). The various
sections of SOX were divided into separate rules by the SEC, which then solicited public comments
regarding its proposing rule releases, prior to drafting the ﬁnal adopting releases. Letters to the
SEC commenting on the proposed rule releases were made publicly available on the SEC web site
or through its public reference oﬃce.
Following the main compliance-related titles of SOX, we classify the rules on which the SEC
solicited comments into groups, focusing on three major sets of rules: provisions related to enhanced
ﬁnancial disclosure (including the much discussed Section 404 assessment of internal controls),
provisions related to corporate responsibility, and provisions related to auditor independence. Our
ﬁrst approach to evaluating the eﬀect of SOX on shareholder value is to classify the nature of
comment letters submitted to the SEC by individual investors and investor groups. We document
that based on their letters to the SEC, individual investors were overwhelmingly in favor of strict
implementation of SOX, across all three categories of proposed rules. Importantly, lobbying by
1investor groups such as pension funds and labor unions, who presumably are more sophisticated
than individual shareholders, was equally supportive. These ﬁndings allow us to speak to the
perceived value of SOX for shareholders. To the extent that investors were suﬃciently informed
and suﬃciently sophisticated to evaluate the costs and beneﬁts of SOX, these ﬁndings suggest that
SOX was perceived to be beneﬁcial to individual investors and investor groups. This result stands in
stark contradiction to the conclusions of studies such as Zhang (2005), who argue that shareholder
reactions to SOX were unfavorable based on the price movement of the market as a whole.
To provide additional evidence on the value of SOX, our second approach utilizes the comment
letters sent to the SEC by and on behalf of corporate insiders. Our reading of these letters reveals
that an overwhelming majority of insiders in lobbying companies opposed strict implementation
of SOX, and argued strongly for delays, exemptions and loopholes in its implementation. While
lobbying by investors in favor of SOX is useful for distinguishing between the improved disclosure
and corporate governance view and the costly compliance view of SOX, lobbying by insiders against
strict implementation is not informative for this purpose in and of itself. Corporate insiders may
lobby against strict implementation of SOX both if SOX was expected to succeed in improving
disclosure and governance or if the dominant eﬀect of SOX was expected to be its high compliance
costs.1
Lobbying by corporate insiders against strict implementation of SOX, however, can be used as
a proxy to identify companies more likely to be aﬀected by the legislation (positively or negatively),
and thus allows us to circumvent the lack of a control group of ﬁrms unaﬀected by the Act. Under
the improved disclosure and governance view, these more aﬀected ﬁrms will be those for whom
the governance gain will be greatest. If SOX provides a net beneﬁt in the form of improved
disclosure and corporate governance for shareholders, companies whose insiders lobbied against
strict implementation of SOX should have higher cumulative returns than otherwise similar non-
lobbying companies in the period leading up to the passage of SOX, as the market adjusts its
expectations of future cash ﬂows for these companies relative to their matched, less-aﬀected peers.
Conversely, under the compliance cost view, where SOX is detrimental to shareholders because it
imposes costs that outweigh any associated governance gains, the more aﬀected companies will be
those for whom the net costs are highest, and thus we would expect lobbyers to experience lower
1Under the improved disclosure and governance view, insiders lobby against strict implementation due to SOX’s
eﬀect of reducing insiders’ ability to divert resources to themselves. Under the compliance cost view, insiders may
lobby against SOX either because they choose to lobby in the interest of company shareholders, or because they
anticipate a possible reduction in diversion of resources.
2cumulative returns than non-lobbyers.
One aspect of our research design, important for interpreting our ﬁndings, is that lobbying
of the SEC with regards to implementation of SOX primarily occurred after the passage of the
Act itself. For our identiﬁcation strategy to be powerful, it must be the case that the market
could predict which ﬁrms would be most aﬀected (and hence, which insiders would lobby against
strict implementation of SOX) based on ex-ante observable characteristics of ﬁrms. To validate
our empirical strategy, we provide direct evidence that lobbying was to some extent predictable
based on variables publicly observable at the start of our sample. Furthermore, an event study of
abnormal returns observed around the date of submission of a comment letter by a given company
indicates that there was no discernable market reaction to the submission of the letter, suggesting
that market participants were not surprised to see which ﬁrms lobbied.
Our portfolio analysis of returns reveals that during the period from February to July of 2002
leading up to passage of SOX, cumulative returns were approximately 10 percentage points higher
for corporations whose insiders lobbied against one or more of the SOX ‘Enhanced Disclosure’
provisions than for non-lobbying ﬁrms with similar size, book-to-market and industry characteris-
tics. Similarly, we ﬁnd some evidence of higher cumulative returns for corporations whose insiders
lobbied against one or more of the SOX ‘Corporate Responsibility’ provisions and for corporations
whose insiders lobbied against one or more of the SOX ‘Auditor Independence’ provisions than for
comparable non-lobbying ﬁrms. Many ﬁrms who lobbied against strict implementation of the ‘Cor-
porate Responsibility’ or ‘Auditor Independence’ provisions, however, also lobbied against strict
implementation of one or more of the ‘Enhanced Disclosure’ provisions. We therefore proceed to
estimate the separate abnormal returns associated with each of the three categories by running
ﬁrm-level regressions. The results from our ﬁrm-level models imply a total abnormal excess return
of approximately 10 percent during the period leading up to the passage of SOX for ﬁrms whose
insiders lobbied against the ‘Enhanced Disclosure’ provisions, but a total abnormal excess return
of only 3 percent and 1 percent for ﬁrms lobbying against ‘Corporate Responsibility’ or ’Audi-
tor Independence’ provisions, respectively. These relative returns suggest that while investors did
not disapprove of the ‘Corporate Responsibility’ or ‘Auditor Independence’ provisions, the market
expected SOX to mainly beneﬁt the ﬁrms most aﬀected by provisions related to ‘Enhanced Dis-
closure,’ rather than those aﬀected primarily by ‘Corporate Responsibility’ provisions or ‘Auditor
Independence’ provisions.
3In the second part of our analysis, we focus on the returns of lobbying and non-lobbying ﬁrms
during the period after the passage of SOX. If investors’ positive expectations regarding the overall
eﬀects of SOX were warranted, one would not expect any diﬀerences between the returns of lobbying
and non-lobbying ﬁrms in the post-passage period. If, on the other hand, shareholders gradually
became aware that the measures introduced by SOX did not in fact result in higher earnings,
due, for example, either to a watering down of the rules during implementation or to higher than
expected compliance costs (for more aﬀected ﬁrms in particular), then one should observe abnormal
negative returns for lobbying ﬁrms relative to non-lobbyers in the period following SOX passage
and until investor expectations settle at a new, less optimistic level. Our analysis of returns in
the post-passage period indicates that the returns for ﬁrms who lobbied against an ‘Enhanced
Disclosure’ rule were similar to the returns for their non-lobbying comparison group of ﬁrms, and
thus that the increase in relative stock price experienced by lobbying ﬁrms did not tend to reverse
during the post-passage period.
To further validate our reseach design, in the ﬁnal part of our analysis, we repeat the study
of returns described above, replacing the lobbying ﬁrms with those ﬁrms who, based on ex-ante
characteristics, our probit model would predict would lobby. We ﬁnd roughly similar results when
employing predicted lobbyers rather than actual lobbyers as the proxy for more aﬀected ﬁrms.
In sum, our study documents, ﬁrst, that investors expected SOX to more closely align interests
of insiders and shareholders; second, that (relative) returns during the period leading up to SOX
passage are consistent with the views of investors; and third, that investors’ positive expectations
may have been warranted, based on returns in the post-SOX period. Consistent with the arguments
presented by Coates (2006), our results indicate that in the eyes of public company shareholders,
the most important and eﬀective provisions in SOX were the ‘Enhanced Disclosure’ provisions,
rather than the provisions related to ‘Corporate Responsibility’ and ‘Auditor Independence’.
An obvious shortcoming of a research design which compares more aﬀected ﬁrms to less aﬀected
ﬁrms, without having a comparable group of ﬁrms unaﬀected by the legislation studied, is that it
does not speak directly to the overall eﬀect of SOX on the public equity market. We can say that
considering the full period from when serious discussions about the legislation ﬁrst started in week
7 of 2002 and until the end of 2004 (well into the implementation phase of SOX), the stocks of more
aﬀected ﬁrms (as proxied for by lobbying ﬁrms) outperformed those of less aﬀected ﬁrms (proxied
for by non-lobbying ﬁrms). Based on our returns analysis alone, we cannot unambiguously say
4that the net beneﬁt of SOX for either group is positive. However, we employ estimates of SOX
compliance costs and argue that the beneﬁt to shareholders in the more aﬀected (lobbying) ﬁrms
is likely to be positive. Furthermore, with the addition of two conservative assumptions, we argue
that the new beneﬁt to shareholders in general is likely to be positive.
A second important caveat to our analysis is that we are not able to speak to the welfare eﬀects
of SOX, but rather only to the law’s eﬀects on shareholders of publicly listed companies at the start
of our sample. For example, our analysis cannot measure the overall welfare eﬀect of changes in
the propensity to list or remain listed on U.S. markets due to SOX-related costs (Zingales (2006)).
In addition, we cannot rule out that insiders lost an amount equal to or greater than what outside
investors gained. Finally, we note that while our analysis suggests that shareholders expected
SOX to be value-increasing on average for publicly traded ﬁrms, the lobbying ﬁrms in our sample
are predominantly large, established organizations, and thus our returns analysis does not provide
speciﬁc conclusions as to the eﬀect of SOX on smaller ﬁrms.
Our study is related to an emerging literature attempting to evaluate the eﬀects of SOX. An
insightful review of this literature, which has not produced a general consensus on the eﬀects or
value of the Act, is presented in Coates (2006). Zhang (2005) examines the reaction of the overall
U.S. stock market to legislative events leading to the passage of the Act. While Zhang (2005) ﬁnds
signiﬁcantly negative returns around legislative events leading to the passage of SOX, these returns
might be due to other, confounding events unrelated to SOX. Rezaee and Jain (2003) also study
the aggregate market reaction to SOX, reaching the opposite conclusion of Zhang (2005).
As in our paper, other studies seek to circumvent the lack of a control group of unaﬀected ﬁrms
by use of alternative approaches or outcome variables. Cohen, Dey and Lys (2005) evaluate the
impact of SOX by examining changes in earnings management behavior and in the informativeness
of earnings announcements of ﬁrms around the passage of the Act. They ﬁnd a decline in earnings
management activity following the passage of SOX. Engel, Hayes and Wang (2004) study ﬁrms’
going-private decisions and ﬁnd a modest increase in the number of ﬁrms going private after the
passage of SOX. The paper closest to ours in approach is Chhaochharia and Grinstein (2005),
who study the announcement eﬀect of SOX on ﬁrm value. To overcome the lack of an unaﬀected
control group, they sort ﬁrms into groups most and least compliant with certain proposed SOX
provisions in the pre-SOX period. Based on a comparison of these two groups, their study ﬁnds
a positive value eﬀect associated with SOX for large ﬁrms, whereby ﬁrms that need to make the
5most changes in order to comply with the new rules outperform ﬁrms that require fewer changes
over the announcement period. Conversely, they ﬁnd a negative eﬀect for small ﬁrms. While
Chhaochharia and Grinstein (2005) study the perceived value of SOX for ﬁrms most aﬀected by
certain speciﬁc provisions of the Act, our lobbying approach allows us to expand on their work
by examining shareholders’ views regarding the full spectrum of SOX’s provisions, as well as to
diﬀerentiate between the various categories of these provisions. Additionally, since our analysis
extends to the period after the passage of the law, we are also able to separate the perceived eﬀects
of the Act as passed in Congress from the net eﬀects resulting from the actual implementation of
those rules.
Our paper is also related to a growing literature that uses the lobbying activities of corporations
to examine the impact of regulation. King and O’Keefe (1986) examine the relationship between
corporate lobbying and trading activities of corporate insiders surrounding proposed accounting
standards that require ﬁrms to expense oil and gas exploration expenditures associated with dry
holes. A more closely related study is that of Lo (2003), who examines the economic consequences of
the 1992 revision of executive compensation disclosure rules using a lobbying approach quite similar
to that employed in this study. Lo (2003) ﬁnds, in support of the value of increased disclosure,
that corporations whose insiders lobbied the SEC against the proposed regulation had positive
excess stock returns of about 6% over the 8-month period between the SEC’s announcement that it
would be pursuing reform and the adoption of the proposed regulation. In addition to addressing
a diﬀerent reform, a key diﬀerence between Lo (2003) and this study is that we study not only
the opinions of corporations who lobby the SEC, but also the views of non-investor groups and of
individual investors and investor groups.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section I presents an overview of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act, the time line of its adoption, and the role of lobbying in the design of the
resulting rules. Section II details our hypotheses and research method. Section III presents and
our empirical ﬁndings. Section IV discusses the interpretations and implications of our ﬁndings.
Section V concludes.
6I. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act Of 2002
A. The Legislative Time-Line
The collapse of Enron in October 2001, followed by the subsequent exposure of a string of accounting
and governance scandals at Qwest Communications, Global Crossing, Worldcom, Adelphia and
Tyco in the spring of 2002, triggered a ﬂurry of legislative proposals to reform corporate business
practices and improve accounting and governance systems for publicly traded companies.
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act resulted from the combination of reform bills introduced by Senator
Paul Sarbanes, Democrat of Maryland, and Representative Michael Oxley, Republican of Ohio,
in the Senate and House, respectively. Representative Oxley’s reform bill was ﬁrst introduced in
the House on February 13th, 2002. Oxley’s bill was passed in committee on April 16th, 2002,
and was subsequently passed in the House on April 24th, 2002. In May of 2002, the Sarbanes
reform bill was circulated in the Senate Banking Committee, which passed the bill on June 18th,
2002. The full Senate began debate on Sarbanes’ bill on July 8th 2002, and passed the bill with
overwhelming support on July 15th, 2002. On July 19th, 2002, the House and Senate formed a
conference committee and began negotiations to merge the two bills. The ﬁnal legislative bill, to
be known as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, was passed in Congress on July 25th, 2002, and was
signed into law by the President on July 30th of that year.
SOX directed the SEC to immediately begin rule-making activities, and the SEC commenced
such action in late August 2002. SOX-directed rule making activities continued throughout 2003
and into the beginning of 2004. The major rule-making activities were completed by June 2004.
B. The Content of the Act
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act established the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB)
and laid out new rules for and restrictions on corporations, corporate directors and auditors. The
Act is arranged into eleven titles.
The ﬁrst four titles of the Act are the most relevant for issues of public company compliance.
Title I of the Act establishes the PCAOB, which is charged with overseeing and registering public
accounting ﬁrms and establishing standards related to auditing and internal controls. Title II of
the Act covers issues related to auditor independence, and places restrictions on public accounting
ﬁrms with regards to the provision of non-auditing services, as well as mandating periodic rotation
of the coordinating and reviewing auditing partners. Title III of the Act deals with corporate re-
7sponsibilities, including the independence of the auditing committee, improper inﬂuence on conduct
of audits, executive certiﬁcation of ﬁnancial reports, penalties related to ﬁnancial restatements, and
rules of professional responsibility for attorneys. Title IV of the Act deals with enhanced ﬁnancial
disclosure, including disclosures in periodic reports, enhanced conﬂict of interest provisions, disclo-
sure of transactions involving management or principal stockholders, the disclosure of the existence
of an audit committee ﬁnancial expert, and the much-discussed management assessment of internal
controls.
The remaining titles of the Act primarily deal with issues unrelated to compliance by publicly
traded ﬁrms, or set out criminal penalties and as such were (with two exceptions noted below) not
subject to interpretation and implementation by the SEC. Title V of the Act deals with analyst
conﬂicts of interest, Title VI deals with SEC resources and authority, and Title VII with studies
and reports. Title VIII of the act deals with corporate and criminal fraud accountability, and Title
IX with white collar crime penalty enhancements. Title X deals with the signing of corporate tax
returns by chief executive oﬃcers, and Title XI with deﬁnitions of corporate fraud and account-
ability. Of these remaining titles only Title VIII, section 802, on criminal penalties for altering
documents and Title IX, Section 906, on corporate responsibility for ﬁnancial reports generated
SEC rule-making. We group SEC rules related to Sections 802 and 906 with those related to Title
III since they cover similar topics. Due to the SEC’s lack of rule-making activities with regards to
Title V, VI, VII, X and XI, we do not deal directly with these Titles of the Act.
We classify the rule-making activities of the SEC with regards to Titles I through IV of SOX
into three broad categories. Rule-making activities related to auditor independence, Title II of
SOX, are classiﬁed as ‘Auditor Independence’ rules. Rule-making activities related to corporate
responsibilities, Title III of SOX, are classiﬁed as ‘Corporate Responsibility’ rules. Rule-making
related to issues of enhanced ﬁnancial disclosure and the PCAOB, Titles IV and I of SOX, are clas-
siﬁed as ‘Enhanced Financial Disclosure’ rules. We include Title I, which establishes the PCAOB,
in the ‘Enhanced Disclosure’ rules category due to the close overlap between the PCAOB’s respon-
sibilities and rule-making and the disclosure items mandated in Title IV. Indeed, a signiﬁcant part
of the PCAOB’s purpose is to determine and regulate the standards for the enhanced disclosures
mandated by Title IV.2
In conjunction with the federal legislation, the major stock exchanges produced their own
2All our reported results are robust if the rules relating to Title IV are analyzed separately from those relating to
the PCAOB.
8governance-related listing requirements. In February of 2002, the SEC called on the major stock
exchanges to review their governance requirements. NYSE’s and NASD’s boards adopted gover-
nance proposals and submitted them to the SEC for approval. The SEC solicited public comment
on these proposals, and upon reviewing the comments, approved the NYSE and NASD propos-
als with some modiﬁcations. We include SEC rule-making related to the governance and listing
standards of the NYSE and NASDAQ exchanges in the ‘Corporate Responsibilities’ category.
Additionally, contemporaneously with SOX rule-making, the SEC issued a number of proposed
rules on disclosure-related issues which were either adopted or replaced by a SOX mandated rule.
Due to the topics of these rules, they are included in the ‘Enhanced Financial Disclosure’ category.3
In the fall of 2003, the SEC proposed one further rule related to corporate responsibility, which
was not part of SOX, and which eventually was not implemented. This rule relates to nominations
of directors by security holders. We tabulate letters for this rule in Appendix A, but subsequently
leave out ﬁrms that lobbied for or against this rule from our sets of lobbying and non-lobbying
ﬁrms since the rule was not implemented.
C. The Role of Lobbying in the Design of the Rules
The Sarbanes Oxley Act is a statute, and as such, can only be changed by another Act of Congress
or by a court that rules it unconstitutional. As Congress was well aware of the lengthy time-line
required to perpetuate new or amended legislation, SOX mainly consisted of principles. The rules
and enforcement actions by which these principles are implemented were left to be set by the SEC,
which can respond rapidly to feedback and update the rules as needed (Coates (2006)).
Section 3A of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act grants authority to the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission to “promulgate such rules and regulations, as may be necessary or appropriate in the
public interest or for the protection of investors, and in furtherance of this Act.” The SEC started
rule-making activities in August 2002. The rule-making activities directed by SOX continued into
2003 and 2004. The SEC took public comments into consideration when drafting the ﬁnal rules,
and indeed, shareholders, corporations and others could and did inﬂuence how strictly SOX was
implemented.
After the passage of SOX, the relevant sections of each title were broken down and drafted in
a proposing release, which was then circulated by the SEC for public comment. At the end of the
comment period, the SEC drafted and approved a ﬁnal adopting release for each rule. In Appendix
3All our reported results are robust to exclusion of these rules.
9A we classify and brieﬂy describe all of the SOX-related rules proposed by the SEC. We report
the date of the proposing release, the date of the adopting release, the related SOX section, and
whether the rule was adopted with or without amendments and further restrictions.4
For each of the proposed rules, the SEC solicited public comments that were to be submitted to
the SEC after the proposing release date by a speciﬁc deadline prior to the adopting release date.
Comment letters submitted to the SEC by electronic means are made available to the public on
the SEC website. Comment letters submitted in paper form were made available through the SEC
public reference section. In Section III, we describe the content of the letters submitted to the SEC
in detail.
The major event window we employ to understand the perceived value of SOX is the time
period leading to the approval of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. Our event window starts on February
8, 2002, and ends on July 26, 2002. The ﬁrst week of our event window leading up to SOX passage
is thus the week that includes February 13, 2002, when Oxley’s bill was introduced in the House
and the SEC announced that it intended to propose several rules designed to improve disclosure
and governance. The last week of the window includes July 25, 2002, when Congress passed the
law.5 Because most of the rule making activity is concentrated after the passage of the Act (after
July 25th, 2002), the event window allows us to separate the perceived eﬀect of the law from the
information potentially generated by the submission of comments to the SEC.
To understand the eﬀects of SOX as implemented, as opposed the perceived eﬀects of the bill
as passed by Congress, we also examine the period following the passage of the Act, from July
26th, 2002, to the end of 2004. By examining returns for lobbying and non-lobbying ﬁrms in the
post-passage period, we can assess the net eﬀect of the ﬁnal SOX rules, given the strictness and
eﬀectiveness of the implementation, and the costs of compliance associated with such.
II. Hypotheses and Research Method
There are two competing views of the likely impact of SOX. The view on which Congress based
the act is that SOX would improve disclosure and governance, thereby decreasing misconduct by
corporate insiders and increasing value for shareholders above and beyond the associated costs of
4Three of the proposing releases that we list as releases generated by SOX were issued before the actual passage
of the law. These are cases where the content of the SEC’s proposed rule subsequently was mandated by SOX and
adopted as such, or where the SEC’s proposed rule was augmented by a subsequent release under SOX and adopted
as such.
5While the president only signed the law on July 30, 2002, presidential approval was viewed as a foregone conclusion
once the Act was passed in Congress.
10compliance. Under this positive view of the act we would expect the following:
1. Lobbying: Shareholders should support SOX, while corporate insiders should oppose it.
2. Returns during the period leading up to passage of SOX: In the cross-section of ﬁrms, returns
should be higher for more aﬀected ﬁrms.6
The improved disclosure and governance view of the Act also predicts that, on average, across
ﬁrms, returns during the period leading up to passage should be abnormally positive (relative to
a set of ﬁrms with no news about disclosure and governance), and average operating performance
should improve in the post-SOX period. Given the lack of a control group of (comparable US)
ﬁrms not impacted by SOX, these additional predictions are impossible to test, as they cannot be
distinguished from aggregate shocks unrelated to SOX.
The alternative view of SOX is that the main impact of SOX would be to impose large compli-
ance costs on ﬁrms with a negative net eﬀect of the act on shareholder value. This view is based
on the prior that SOX would be ineﬀective in diminishing any misconduct, and that compliance
costs would be suﬃciently large to outweigh any beneﬁts. Proponents of this view would argue
that private markets already lead to the shareholder value maximizing disclosure and governance
structure, and that government interference leads to sub-optimally large amounts of resources being
spent on disclosure and governance issues. Under the compliance cost view, one would expect the
following:
1. Lobbying: Shareholders should oppose SOX. Corporate insiders should either oppose it (if
they are acting on behalf of shareholders or if SOX has some ability to reduce insider mis-
conduct), or be indiﬀerent to it (if SOX is ineﬀective in reducing insider misconduct).
2. Returns during the period leading up to passage of SOX: In the cross-section of ﬁrms, returns
should be lower for more aﬀected ﬁrms.
The compliance cost view also has predictions about the average eﬀect of SOX across ﬁrms.
Returns during the period leading up to passage should be abnormally negative (relative to a set of
ﬁrms with no news about disclosure and governance), and operating performance should be worse
6As the probability of legislation went from zero to one, the price of a given company should gradually move
upward from P to P +∆ Psox where ∆Psox is the present value of the increase in dividends due to SOX. If
∆Psox
P
diﬀers in the cross-section, ﬁrms with large values will be observed to have abnormally good returns over this period.
11in the post-SOX period. Once again, given the lack of a control group of ﬁrms not impacted by
SOX, these predictions are impossible to test.
From the above, it is clear that studying lobbying behavior is informative about the average
eﬀect (across companies) of SOX on shareholders. The views of shareholders are particularly
informative, while lobbying by corporate insiders against SOX contains less direct evidence about
SOX’s average eﬀect on shareholders, since insiders should oppose SOX under both the improved
disclosure and governance view and the compliance cost view. Lobbying by insiders is however still
useful for distinguishing between the two views of SOX, under the assumption that insiders are more
likely to lobby in ﬁrms more aﬀected (positively or negatively) by SOX. Under this assumption,
ﬁrms can be split into groups based on whether the insiders lobbied against SOX or not, and this
split can be used to test the cross-sectional predictions regarding returns during the period leading
up to passage of SOX.
One aspect of our research design is important for interpreting our ﬁndings. The majority
of lobbying occurs after the passage of SOX in congress on July 25th, 2002. Our approach to
testing the predictions for stock returns during the period leading up to passage will therefore only
be powerful if (i) shareholders were aware which types of ﬁrms were likely to lobby, and (ii) the
relationship between lobbying and returns is causal.
In our analysis, we will provide three pieces of evidence to demonstrate (i) above. First, we
examine the extent to which lobbying is predictable based on variables known at the start of our
sample. Second, we conduct a ﬁrm level event study of returns for lobbying ﬁrms around the date
of submission of a letter to the SEC. To the extent that lobbying is to some extent predictable, and
the event study reveals no abnormal returns, these tests provide support for our research design and
the interpretability of our ﬁndings. Third, to the extent that our analysis does reveal diﬀerences in
the returns over the leadup period for lobbying and non-lobbying ﬁrms, this will provide evidence
in and of itself that our assumption is reasonable.
While the reverse causality concern raised in (ii) is potentially a problem, our research design
allows us to speak to this issue. Reverse causality in our setting would imply that good returns
caused insiders to lobby. However, any such eﬀect would not predict a signiﬁcant diﬀerential in
the excess returns of lobbying ﬁrms (over and above similar non-lobbyers) when comparing the
pre- and post-passage periods. To the extent that excess returns of lobbyers diﬀer in the pre- and
post-passage period, this suggests that causality goes in the direction we assume, i.e. that being
12more aﬀected by SOX leads to excess returns, rather than it being simply the case that better (or
worse) performing ﬁrms tend to lobby, without neccesarily being more aﬀected by the legislation.
A signiﬁcant diﬀerential in the pre- and post-passage excess returns of lobbyers will thus validate
our research design.
It is worth noting that while this approach can be used to help resolve the causality concern in
our return analysis, we cannot use a similar approach to examine changes in operating performance
for lobbying and non-lobbying groups in a causal fashion: while return data is available on a weekly
basis, operating performance is only available to us on an annual basis, and thus does not allows
us to examine whether there is a kink in performance around the date of SOX passage. Following
the presentation of our ﬁndings on lobbying and returns, we will return to the question of what we
can learn from an analysis of operating performance in this setting.
A natural question that arises if indeed lobbying is predictable, is why we should choose to use
lobbying as a proxy for more aﬀected ﬁrms, rather than simply using the variables that predict
lobbying. There are two central advantages to a research design that employs lobbying rather than
its predictors. First, lobbying is likely a stronger proxy for being more aﬀected than the predictors
of lobbying alone. By employing the predictors instead of lobbying itself, the researcher is limited to
a few observable variables that likely do not fully capture many of the aspects of a ﬁrm’s structure
or management that may cause it to be more aﬀected by SOX (and which may be known to the
market). We cannot as econometricians observe the state of a ﬁrm’s internal controls, nor many
aspects of its governance or management. Indeed, while we will demonstrate that lobbying is to
some extent predictable, it is clear from our results in the following section that a substantial
amount of the variation in lobbying is not driven by variables observable to us.7 Lobbying, on
the other hand, is in essence revealed preference, and therefore is likely to capture many more of
these aspects of the ﬁrm. Second, some characteristics will tend to predict lobbying against all
the diﬀerent categories of SOX-related rules. Using predictors rather than actual lobbying would
therefore make it diﬃcult to distinguish the relative beneﬁt of the various subsections of SOX.
In contrast, lobbying can be observed at the individual rule level, thus allowing the researcher to
distinguish between shareholders’ reactions to diﬀerent aspects of SOX. Nonetheless, we will provide
supplementary results analyzing the returns of ﬁrms that would be predicted to lobby based on
their ex-ante observable characteristics, regardless of whether or not they actually lobby. Similar
7In contrast, it is reasonable to assume that shareholders were able to observe more information in real-time than
we as econometricians can observe, and therefore that they were better able to predict lobbying than our models can.
13patterns in returns for these ﬁrms in the pre- and post-passage periods will lend further support to
our research design.
III. Results
A. Opinions of Letter Writers
The opinions of commenters are tabulated in Table I. Overall, our study is based on 2689 letters.
Panel A shows how the letters are distributed across various types of letter writers. Of the 2689
letters, 793 are from corporations (or more precisely, from corporate managers or directors). 253 are
from non-investor groups such as the Business Roundtable and the American Society of Corporate
Secretaries. 275 of the letters are from investor groups, typically pension funds (including union
pension funds), and 553 are from individuals. The remaining 815 letters are from accountants
(individuals and groups), lawyers (individuals and groups), academics, or others (mainly church
groups and governments). Around 92 percent of the letters were submitted after July 25th, 2002,
the date of the passage of the Act, with 34 percent submitted in the remainder of 2002, 48 percent
submitted in 2003 and 10 percent submitted in 2004.
We classify the letters into three categories. Letters classiﬁed as “Positive” are those who
favored the rule commented on, or who called for stronger measures than those stated in the SEC’s
proposing release. Letters classiﬁed as “Negative” are those who opposed the rule commented on,
or argues for delays or exemptions in its implementation. The last category, “Neutral”, is used
for letters which commented on several of the sub-provisions in a particular proposing release and
where the commenter was positive on some sub-provisions and negative on others. A small number
of letters which were diﬃcult to classify are also included in the neutral category.
The top panel of Table I shows for each type of commenter, and across all rules, the total
number and percentage of positive letters, neutral letters, and negative letters. It is clear that
individuals and investor groups were overwhelmingly in favor of the SOX provisions. 78 percent
of letters from individuals and 88 percent of letters from investor groups were in favor of the rule
commented on. An important feature of comment letters from individual and investor groups is
that the opinions expressed are not speciﬁc to a particular ﬁrm. In other words, the letters most
likely state the letter writer’s view of the average eﬀect of the particular provision across stocks,
as opposed to its eﬀect on an individual ﬁrm. Of course, it is possible that some individuals may
be motivated by particularly poor disclosure/governance for a particular ﬁrm whose stock they
14own. However, since the provisions of SOX apply to all publicly traded ﬁrms, it seems fair to
consider opinions expressed as views about the total set of stocks the investor/investor group holds
or intends to hold in the future. Under this assumption, the positive views expressed by the vast
majority of individual investors and investor groups provide support for the improved disclosure
and governance view of SOX.
The remainder of Table I tabulates opinions by the rule and major rule category commented on.
We ﬁrst present results for the major rule category ‘Enhanced Financial Disclosure and PCAOB’
(SOX Title IV and I)8, then turn to the results for ‘Corporate Responsibility’ (SOX Title III) and
last the results for ‘Auditor Independence’ (SOX Title II). The ‘Auditor Independence’ rule gener-
ated much fewer comments, the majority of which were submitted by accountants and accounting
ﬁrms.
Approximately 80 percent of both individual investors and investor groups wrote in favor of the
‘Enhanced Disclosure’ rule they were commenting on, with similar results for individual investors
and investor groups that comment on a ‘Corporate Responsibility’ rule. Investors thus appear to
view both the disclosure and governance provisions of SOX as being value increasing, even after
any compliance costs borne by shareholders. Investor groups who lobbied were overwhelmingly in
favor of the ‘Auditor Independence’ rules, while the few individuals who commented on these rules
were more divided.
The opinions of corporations and of non-investor groups contrast starkly with those of investors.
Across all rules, 82 percent of letters written by corporations (corporate managers or directors) and
72 percent of letters written by non-investor groups argued against the rule they commented on.
Roughly similar percentages of letters from corporations and non-investor groups express negative
views about the rules in all three individual categories of SOX provisions.
Since both the improved disclosure and governance hypothesis and the compliance cost hypoth-
esis predict that insiders should lobby against SOX, alternative theories are required to explain the
7 percent of corporations and 17 percent of non-investor groups who lobbied in favor of the rule
commented on. At least one CEO of a large publicly traded ﬁrm has stated that he is in favor
of SOX because compliance costs were disproportionately large for smaller ﬁrms and therefore put
these at a competitive disadvantage. An alternative story for positive lobbying by a minority of
corporations and non-investor groups is that these CEOs acted on behalf of shareholders and thus
8For brevity we will refer to this category as ‘Enhanced Disclosure’ in what follows.
15expressed views in line with those of the majority of individuals and investor groups.9
For data availability reasons, our subsequent analysis focuses on publicly traded corporations.
A given letter may be signed by managers or directors of multiple companies. 80 percent of the
793 letters from corporations are signed by at least one manager/director from a publicly traded
company. Letters that represent insiders of publicly traded ﬁrms are even more likely to express
negative views about the rule commented on. 87 percent of such letters express negative views,
compared to 59 percent for letters representing a non-publicly traded ﬁrm.
A given company’s managers or directors may be signatories to multiple letters and a total of 395
publicly traded ﬁrms are represented among the corporate letters. To ease the interpretation of our
results, in our groups of lobbying ﬁrms below we omit letters from corporations expressing neutral
or positive opinions, as there are too few such letters to allow a separate analysis of these ﬁrms.10
Of the 395 publicly traded ﬁrms that are represented among the corporate letters, 288 ﬁrms are
thus classiﬁed as lobbying against ‘Enhanced Disclosure’ and/or ‘Corporate Responsibility’, and/or
‘Auditor Independence’.11
With regards to the other types of letter writers, the majority of accountants and lawyers argued
against the rules they commented on, while opinions of academics and others were more mixed.
The negative views of accountants and lawyers often refer to cases where the letter writer points
out practical complexities of the rule commented on, or where auditors lobby against regulation
that restricts the advisory role of auditing ﬁrms.
B. Predictability Of Lobbying By Corporate Insiders
Since most lobbying took place after the passage of SOX, our research design implicitly assumes
that lobbying is, at least to some extent, predictable by investors. If not, we would not expect to
observe diﬀerent returns between lobbying ﬁrms and matched non-lobbying ﬁrms during the period
leading up to passage of SOX. The fact that we do ﬁnd diﬀerent returns between the two groups
by itself provides evidence that this assumption is reasonable.
Two additional analyses further support this assumption underlying our research design. First,
a simple probit model indicates that lobbying is to some extent predictable based on observable
9In our subsequent returns analysis we will include a measure of insider stock ownership to control for diﬀerences
in the incentives of insiders to lobby on shareholders’ behalf.
10If a ﬁrm submits comments on several rules within a major rule category (i.e. several rules within ‘Enhanced
Disclosure’) we classify them as lobbying against this major rule category only if all submitted comments are negative.
11The diﬀerence between the 395 and the 288 ﬁrms is driven by ﬁrms with neutral/positive letters and by the ﬁrms
who only comment on the SEC’s proposed rule on Security Holder Director Nominations discussed above.
16variables known at the start of our sample. Second, a ﬁrm-level event study reveals no abnormal
returns for lobbying ﬁrms around the date of submission of a letter to the SEC, suggesting that
l o b b y i n gd o e sn o tc o m ea sas u r p r i s et ot h em a r k e t .
B.1. Probit Models of Lobbying
We begin by demonstrating that it is possible to predict to a certain extent which ﬁrms will lobby
based on ﬁrm characteristics at the start of our sample. We run probit regressions where the
dependent variable is an indicator variable taking a value of one if the ﬁrm lobbied the SEC against
a SOX-related provision, and zero otherwise. We estimate the probit models separately for each of
the three major rule categories. We include a variety of variables that may predict lobbying.
L a r g e rﬁ r m sm a yf e e lt h e ya r em o r el i k e l yt ob ea b l et oi n ﬂ u e n c et h eS E Cr u l em a k e r s ;i ft h e r ei s
a ﬁxed cost element to lobbying, they may also incur lower relative costs of lobbying. In addition,
to lobbying, insiders of larger ﬁrms may be extracting more resources and thus have a stronger
incentive to try and weaken the implemented rules. As a measure of size, we include the natural
logarithm of ﬁrm book assets. Similarly, ﬁrms with more proﬁts for insiders to expropriate may be
more likely to lobby. For each ﬁrm, we calculate the ratio of net income to sales as of the end of
the 2000 ﬁscal year as a measure of proﬁtability.12 Firms with more entrenched management may
be more aﬀected by SOX and may therefore be more likely to lobby. To capture this, we include
the governance index of Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2002). Higher values of this index indicate
more managerial entrenchment.13 We also include the number of years the ﬁrm has been publicly
traded as a measure of ﬁrm age. Firms that have a political action committee (PAC) may tend
to be involved in all types of political and lobbying activities. We therefore include an indicator
variable equal to one if the ﬁrm has a political action committee which was registered with the
Federal Election Commission at some point during the period 1999-2000. Similarly, evidence of past
lobbying may be indicative of future lobbying. We include an indicator variable equal to one if the
ﬁrm lobbied the SEC in regards to the 1992 compensation reform analyzed by Lo (2003), and an
indicator variable equal to one if the ﬁrm lobbied the SEC in regard to a contemporaneous 1992 rule
on proxy ﬁghts.14 Higher institutional ownership may indicate the ﬁrm is better governed ex-ante,
12We use 2000 (as opposed to 2001) data since 2001 net income may only be disclosed in the ﬁrst half of 2002 and
could thus directly aﬀect returns. The reported measure is winsorized at the 2% level, however our results are not
sensitive to variation in the winsorization cutoﬀ.
13All reported results are robust to substituting the Bebchuk, Cohen and Ferrell (2004) index for the Gompers,
Ishii and Metrick (2002) index.
14Data on both these variables was obtained from Kin Lo. The proxy rule is described in further detail by Bradley,
17and therefore less likely to be aﬀected by SOX. To capture this, we include the fraction of shares
outstanding owned by institutions in 2001 as reported by the Thomson Financial CDA/Spectrum
Institutional Holdings database. Since lobbying may be driven by compliance costs, we additionally
include the log of audit fees paid in 2001.15 High pre-SOX audit fees may be associated (positively
or negatively) with SOX compliance costs. To capture the complexity of the ﬁrm (which could
aﬀect both compliance costs and the impact of the rules on management behavior), we calculate
the number of business segments and geographical segments from Compustat in year 2001. Finally,
to capture the incentives of insiders to lobby on behalf os shareholders, we include the fraction of
shares outstanding owned by the top executives of the ﬁrm in 2001 as reported by ExecuComp.16
Summary statistics for these variables are included in Table II.
Table III presents the results of the probit models for lobbying against the three types of
SOX-related provisions. We present three speciﬁcations for each category of provisions. The
ﬁrst speciﬁcation includes the independent variables described above. The second speciﬁcation
examines the extent to which lobbying is predictable based solely on characteristics that have been
systematically shown to relate to returns: market capitalization (calculated at the end of week 6
of 2002), and book-to-market ratio (calculated using book value of equity at the end of ﬁscal year
2001 and market equity at the end of week 6 of 2002). The third speciﬁcation includes all of the
variables from the previous two speciﬁcations, allowing us to examine the predictive power of our
independent variables above and beyond the systematic return-related characteristics. All three
speciﬁcations include industry controls at the 1-digit SIC level. We set a variable to zero if data
is missing and include indicator variables for missing data (the coeﬃcients on these indicators are
omitted from the table).
Given the summary statistics presented in Table II, it is not surprising to see in Table III that
size is a strong predictor of lobbying. A second strong predictor of lobbying is proﬁtability; ﬁrms
with higher ratios of net income to sales are signiﬁcantly more likely to lobby. Note that of the
other regressors included, ﬁrm age is a signiﬁcant predictor of lobbying against an ‘Enhanced Dis-
Brav, Goldstein and Jiang (2006).
15Data on audit fees is obtained from Audit Analytics.
16In unreported results, we also include three additional variables that may indicate poor ﬁrm governance. Following
Chchaochcharia and Grinstein (2005), we include an indicator variable taking the value of one if the ﬁrm’s CEO has
sold a large amount of stock within the 3-month period leading up to a large reported drop in earnings, and an
indicator variable for restated earnings during 1998-2001. Data for both these variables was provided by Yaniv
Grinstein and Vidhi Chhaochharia. Further, we include a measure of discretionary accruals calculated using the
modiﬁed Jones (1991) model, which is intended to measure earnings management. These variables provide little
predictive power in our models, and for brevity, are omitted from our reported results.
18closure’ rule, while past lobbying regarding proxy rules and institutional ownership are signiﬁcant
predictors of lobbying against a ‘Corporate Responsibility’ rule. Such diﬀerential predictive ability
of the variables will allow us to bolster our subsequent returns analysis by employing additional
speciﬁcations that use predicted rather than actual lobbyers.
Psuedo R-squares for the models range from 27 percent for ‘Enhanced Disclosure’ to 36 percent
for ‘Corporate Responsibility,’ suggesting that while our models can predict a sizeable amount of
the variation in lobbying activity, there are other variables driving lobbying which we are unable
to observe or model. It is likely that market participants had more detailed information about ﬁrm
characteristics, and thus that they were able to predict more accurately than our probit models
which ﬁrms would lobby (or more generally, which ﬁrms would be more aﬀected by SOX).
B.2. Event Study of Returns Around Date of Comment Letter
To further ascertain whether investors indeed could predict ex-ante who the lobbying ﬁrms would
be, we supplement the probit results with an event study of whether abnormal returns were observed
around the date of the submission of a letter by a given company (and posting of the letter on the
SEC web page or accessibility of the letter in the SEC’s public reference room).
We examine an event period of 21 weeks ([-10,+10]) surrounding the submission of a letter
to the SEC. If a ﬁrm wrote multiple letters (e.g. lobbying against more than one rule in a given
category), we include an observation for each of the letters, so long as there is no overlap of the
21-week event period [-10,+10]. When letter event periods for the same ﬁrm overlap, we use only
the ﬁrst of the overlapping letters. We examine two sets of abnormal returns, with and without
factor adjustment. For the returns with no factor adjustment, we ﬁrst average the excess returns for
lobbying ﬁrms relative to their matched non-lobbying ﬁrms across the set of lobbying ﬁrms. This
is done for each week in event time where date zero in event time is the week the letter was ﬁled
with the SEC. Average excess returns are then summed over time (in event time) starting 10 weeks
before the event date, and ending 10 weeks after the event date.17 For the factor-adjusted returns,
we follow the same approach, except that the excess return for a given lobbying ﬁrm relative to
its group of matched non-lobbying ﬁrms is replaced by the residual from a regression (run on the
post-SOX period from week 31 of 2002 to the end of 2004) of the excess return on the market
factor, size factor and book-to-market factor. Matching of lobbying and non-lobbying ﬁrms is done
17We omit letters ﬁled within the ﬁrst 10 weeks of SOX passage such that our event study is not aﬀected by the
news of SOX passage itself.
19in three ways: 100 size portfolios, 25 size and 5 book-to-market portfolios, and 25 size and 10 1-digit
industry portfolios. We describe our matching approach in more detail below.
Figure 1 illustrates the ﬁndings of our event study and includes results for all three major rule
categories. The graphs show results for abnormal returns measured relative to a group of non-
lobbying ﬁrms constructed based on 100 size-portfolios. The results based on matching on size
and book-to-market equity or size and industry are similar. If lobbying was not predictable by the
market, we would expect to see a positive or negative reaction to the submission of a letter. Figure
1 reveals no such reaction, suggesting that market participants were not surprised to learn which
ﬁrms lobbied.
C. Returns of Lobbying and Non-Lobbying Firms During the Period Leading
up to Passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
We now turn to the comparison of returns for lobbying and non-lobbying ﬁrms. Under the improved
disclosure and governance hypothesis, returns should be larger for lobbying ﬁrms than for non-
lobbying ﬁrms during the period leading up to passage of SOX. The compliance cost view of SOX
has the opposite prediction.
C.1. Portfolio Level Returns
To test these two competing hypotheses, we must ﬁrst decide precisely how the comparison between
the two sets of ﬁrms should be made. The standard approach for this type of analysis is to calculate
excess returns for a portfolio of the aﬀected ﬁrms (here lobbyers) over and above the returns for
a portfolio of control ﬁrms (here non-lobbyers). To do this calculation, one must decide on which
characteristics lobbying and non-lobbying ﬁrms should be matched, and how ﬁne a grid should be
used to match along a given dimension.
A large literature documents that small ﬁrms (measured by market value of equity) and ﬁrms
with high book-to-market equity ratios on average tend to outperform large ﬁrms and ﬁrms with
low book-to-market ratios. Furthermore, in a particular time period, realized returns could diﬀer
systematically across ﬁrms with diﬀerent size, book-to-market, industry, or other characteristics,
and such patterns may be entirely unrelated to the eﬀects of SOX. It is therefore important to
compare lobbying and non-lobbying ﬁrms with similar characteristics along these dimensions. Of
course, there is a limit to how many characteristics one should match lobbying and non-lobbying
ﬁrms on. In the extreme, if one matched along all observable dimensions related to disclosure,
20governance and variables measuring likely SOX compliance costs, then it may be more or less
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matching scheme would then, by construction, ﬁnd no diﬀerent return patterns between lobbyers
and non-lobbyers and would wrongly lead to the conclusion that SOX was irrelevant for ﬁrm value.
Based on these considerations, we will consider a variety of approaches to match lobbying and non-
lobbying ﬁrms on size, book-to-market, and industry (the leading variables known to be related to
expected returns or likely to be related to realized returns for reasons not related to SOX), but will
not match on variables directly related to disclosure, governance or likely compliance costs. Data
on returns, industry and market capitalization are obtained from CRSP, while data on book equity
values are obtained from COMPUSTAT.
To decide how best to do the matching on size, book-to-market, and industry, we return to Table
II, which tabulates the characteristics of lobbying and non-lobbying ﬁrms. For each characteristic,
we provide p-values for t-tests for equal means across the two groups. The statistics for non-
lobbyers refer to ﬁrms who did not lobby for or against any SOX provision and are therefore
identical for Panel A, which compares ﬁrms who lobbied against any of the ‘Enhanced Disclosure’
rules to non-lobbyers, Panel B, which compares ﬁrms who lobbied against any of the ‘Corporate
Responsibility’ rules to non-lobbyers, and Panel C, which compares ﬁrms who lobbied against the
‘Auditor Independence’ rule to non-lobbyers.
The strongest diﬀerence between the three groups of lobbyers and the non-lobbyers is that
lobbying ﬁrms tend to be much larger than non-lobbying ﬁrms. Along the book-to-market equity
dimension there is little diﬀerence between ﬁrms that lobby against ‘Enhanced Disclosure’ or ‘Audi-
tor Independence’ and non-lobbyers, while ﬁrms that lobby against ‘Corporate Responsibility’ have
signiﬁcantly higher mean (but not median) book-to-market ratios than non-lobbyers. The industry
composition of lobbyers and non-lobbyers diﬀers somewhat, with signiﬁcant diﬀerences for several
industry categories. Together these statistics suggest that a ﬁne grid along the size dimension is
the most important for ensuring that the matched non-lobbying ﬁrms have characteristics similar
to those of the lobbying ﬁrms. We therefore show results for three approaches, deﬁned by how
many comparison portfolios of non-lobbying ﬁrms we construct: (a) 100 size-sorted portfolios (with
NYSE break points to set a ﬁner grid at the top end), (b) 125 size and book-to-market sorted
portfolios deﬁned as the interaction of 25 size categories18 and 5 book-to-market categories, and (c)
18In deﬁning the 25 size portfolios, we use increments of seven percentiles for portfolios up to the 70th percentile.
For the remaining portfolios, we use increments of 2 percentiles, to allow for a ﬁner grid at the top of the range.
21250 size and industry sorted portfolios, deﬁned as the interaction of 25 size categories (with NYSE
break points) and 10 1-digit SIC industry code categories.19
For each approach, we ﬁrst calculate the weekly average portfolio returns for each of the
100/125/250 comparison groups of non-lobbying ﬁrms. We then calculate the average weekly











i,t is the return on lobbying ﬁrm i’s stock in week t, Nt is the number of lobbying ﬁrms
for which returns are available for week t,a n dr
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p,t is the average weekly return in week t
on the portfolio of non-lobbying ﬁrms matched to ﬁrm i.
If the matching succeeds in lining up each lobbying ﬁrm with a set of non-lobbying ﬁrms with
very similar size, book-to-market and industry characteristics, then the above excess return time
series directly measures the abnormal performance (α) of lobbyers. If the match is less accurate,
more precise measures of the abnormal part of any over- or under-performance of lobbyers can
be obtained by estimating a factor model and analyzing the α from such a model. We present
both the results which do not use a factor model and the results which use a 3-factor model and
regress the excess return of lobbyers on the weekly market factor (MKT), size factor (SMB), and
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where rf is the riskless (30-day T-bill) rate and   is an error term.20 T ot h ee x t e n tt h a tr e s u l t s
diﬀer depending on whether a factor model is used, one would expect those from the factor model
to be the most accurate.
Table IV Panel A shows the estimates of abnormal performance of lobbyers relative to non-
lobbyers during the 24-week period leading up to passage of SOX, beginning in week 7 of 2002 and
ending in week 30 of 2002 (February 8, 2002 to July 26, 2002). The top part of the panel shows
strong evidence of positive abnormal returns for ﬁrms whose insiders lobbied against one of the
’Enhanced Disclosure’ provisions, relative to their matched sample of non-lobbyers. Without factor
19In all cases we deﬁne break points using the full set of lobbying and non-lobbying ﬁrms. Size is deﬁned as market
value of equity at the beginning of the week, and is updated weekly. Book-to-market equity ratio is calculated using
book equity for the prior calendar year from COMPUSTAT and market equity for the beginning of the year (with
the exception that we for 2002 use market equity in week 6 of 2002).
20Weekly data are used as opposed to daily data to avoid any potential biases in factor loadings due to diﬀerential
liquidity of the stocks of lobbying and non-lobbying ﬁrms. An alternative would be to use daily data but include lags
of the factors as regressors.
22controls, the weekly alphas in columns (1), (4), and (7) are 0.0051, 0.0042, and 0.0033 across the
three methods of matching. This corresponds to total abnormal returns for such lobbyers of 12.1,
10.2, and 7.9 percent over the 24-week period leading up to SOX passage. In each case, the alphas
are statictically signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero at the one percent level. Results are a bit weaker
when a factor model is used (columns (3), (6) and (9)). A potentially important issue with the
factor model is that if we were to estimate the factor loadings using only 24 weeks of data, this
could lead to overﬁtting and corresponding downward small sample bias in the estimated abnormal
excess returns (alphas). Instead, we use the full time period from week 7 of 2002 to the end of
2004 and allow for diﬀerent alphas for the period leading up to SOX passage and the post-passage
period. The alphas from the factor models in columns (3), (6) and (9) imply total abnormal returns
for such lobbyers of 11.8, 9.6, and 8.4 percent over the 24-week period leading up to SOX passage.21
Figure 2 illustrates the cumulative abnormal returns over time for ﬁrms that lobbied against
an ’Enhanced Disclosure’ provision of SOX. It is based on portfolio level returns and three sets
of cumulative abnormal returns are shown. The ﬁrst of the three is based on the size-matched
control groups of non-lobbying ﬁrms, the second on the size and book-to-market equity matched
control groups and the third on the size and industry-matched control groups. In each graph,
two lines are shown. The unadjusted cumulative abnormal return is calculated by averaging the
excess returns over the comparison group across lobbying ﬁrms in each week, and then summing
these abnormal returns over time, starting in week 7 of year 2002. The factor-adjusted cumulative
abnormal return is calculated by ﬁrst regressing the excess return over the comparison group on the
excess return on the market, and the Fama-French size and book-to-market factors. The regression
is run using weekly data from week 7 of 2002 until the end of 2004, and the intercept (alpha) plus
the residuals are averaged each week and then summed over time. The two vertical lines indicate
the beginning and end of the 24-week period leading up to SOX passage. It is striking how the
abnormal performance of lobbying ﬁrms relative to non-lobbying ﬁrms ends right around the time
of the passage of SOX. This pattern further reassures us that we are indeed measuring the impact
of the law on lobbying ﬁrms.
The middle and bottom parts of Table IV Panel A repeat the same regressions, but now focusing
on ﬁrms who lobbied against a ‘Corporate Responsibility’ or ‘Auditor Independence’ rule. Here,
the evidence for abnormal positive excess returns for lobbying ﬁrms relative to their matched non-
21We discuss the alphas for the post-passage period below.
23lobbying ﬁrms is statistically weaker than for ﬁrms who lobbied against an ‘Enhanced Disclosure’
rule.
As mentioned earlier, an alternative to using lobbying as a proxy for being more aﬀected by SOX
is to instead sort ﬁrms based on their predicted probability of lobbying based on ex-ante character-
istics. As previously discussed, there are numerous advantages to a research design that employs
lobbying rather than its predictors. A major disadvantage of the predicted lobbyer approach is
that we as econometricians likely employ many fewer ﬁrm characteristics than market participants
in predicting which ﬁrms will be more aﬀected by SOX. An advantage of this approach, however,
is that it does not rely on the assumption that market participants could predict precisely which
ﬁrms would lobby after the passage of SOX.
Panel B of Table IV repeats the analysis in Panel A, substituting ﬁrms predicted to lobby by
our probit model for the actual lobbyers, where predicted lobbyers are those ﬁrms whom our probit
models place in the top 3% of ﬁrms based on likelihood of lobbying. Once again, the top part
of the panel presents strong evidence of positive abnormal returns for ﬁrms that our probit model
predicts should lobby against one of the ‘Enhanced Disclosure’ provisions, relative to their matched
sample of non-lobbyers. Without factor controls, the weekly alphas in columns (1), (4), and (7)
are 0.0044, 0.0049, and 0.0027 across the three methods of matching. This corresponds to total
abnormal returns for such lobbyers of 10.6, 11.8, and 6.5 percent over the 24-week period leading
up to SOX passage. The returns implied by the factor models in columns (3), (6) and (9) are
larger: 12.0, 14.4, and 8.9 percent over the 24-week period leading up to SOX passage. In 8 out of
9 speciﬁcations in the panel, the alphas are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero at the 10 or 5 percent
level.
Figure 3 illustrates the cumulative abnormal returns over time for ﬁrms predicted to lobby
against an ‘Enhanced Disclosure’ provision of SOX, and is constructed in a similar manner to
Figure 2. As in Figure 2, which looks at the abnormal returns of lobbying ﬁrms relative to non-
lobbying ﬁrms, the abnormal performance of predicted lobbyers relative to non-lobbying ﬁrms ends
right around the time of the passage of SOX.
The middle and bottom parts of Table IV Panel B repeat the same regressions focusing on
ﬁrms who were predicted by our probit model to lobby against a ‘Corporate Responsibility’ or
‘Auditor Independence’ rule. The evidence for abnormal positive excess returns for predicted
lobbyers relative to their matched non-lobbying ﬁrms for these two sets of rules is again statistically
24weaker than for ﬁrms who were predicted to lobby against an ‘Enhanced Disclosure’ rule.
Interpreting the portfolio-level results presented in Table IV is not straightforward, however.
Over 40 percent of the ﬁrms that lobbied against an ‘Auditor Independence’ provision also lobbied
against at least one ‘Enhanced Disclosure’ provision, and 36 percent of ﬁrms that lobbied against a
‘Corporate Responsibility’ provision also lobbied against at least one ’Enhanced Disclosure’ provi-
sion. To address this issue, we proceed to estimate the separate abnormal returns associated with
each of the three major rule categories by running ﬁrm-level return regressions.
C.2. Firm-Level Returns




i,t − rf,t)=δ0 + γ1I(Lobbied Against Enhanced Disclosure Rules)
+γ2I(Lobbied Against Corporate Responsibility Rules)
+γ3I(Lobbied Against Auditor Independence Rule) + X 
iβ + ui
where I(.) indicates a dummy variable, δ0 is an intercept term, X is a set of control variables and ui
is an error term. The regression is run on the full set of ﬁrms, i.e. including both lobbyers and non-
lobbyers, and has one data point per ﬁrm. In regressions (1), (2), and (3) of Table V Panel A, the
dependent variable is the sum of the weekly excess returns over the riskless rate during the period
leading up to SOX passage. The regression coeﬃcient γ on the dummy variable for a particular
type of lobbying estimates how much the cumulative weekly excess return during the period diﬀers
between that group of lobbying ﬁrms and a typical non-lobbying ﬁrm. To control for diﬀerences
between lobbying and non-lobbying ﬁrms along size, book-to-market, and industry dimensions, and
for similarity to the portfolio-level analysis presented in Table IV, we include indicator variables
for 100 size, 25 size and 5 book-to-market, or 25 size and 10 1-digit industry portfolios, depending
on the speciﬁcation. Table V Panel A presents our estimates for lobbying ﬁrms, while Panel B
presents the estimates for predicted lobbyers.
Regressions (1), (2) and (3) of Table V Panel A indicate that the market expected SOX to beneﬁt
the ﬁrms most aﬀected by its ‘Enhanced Disclosure’ provisions (as evidenced by their lobbying),
with only small added shareholder value for ﬁrms most aﬀected by its ‘Corporate Responsibility’
or ‘Auditor Independence’ provisions. The abnormal excess return for ﬁrms lobbying against an
‘Enhanced Disclosure’ rule captured by the γ1 coeﬃcient indicates a total abnormal excess return
for the lead-up period of between 8.6 percent and 13.2 percent across the three regressions. These
25eﬀects are comparable (theoretically, and in magnitude) to the eﬀects estimated based on the
alphaLead-Up coeﬃcient in the top part of Panel A. The γ2 coeﬃcient on lobbying against a
‘Corporate Responsibility’ rule indicates little abnormal excess return (economically or statistically)
for the lead-up period across the three regressions. The γ3 coeﬃcient on lobbying against the
‘Auditor Independence’ rule indicates a total abnormal excess return for the lead-up period of
between 3.3 percent and 4.0 percent across the three regressions, but with no statistical signiﬁcance
at conventional levels.
We obtain similar results in Panel B of the table, where we replace the indicator variables
for lobbying with indicator variables for being predicted to lobby according to the probit model
in Table III. Being predicted to lobby against an ‘Enhanced Disclosure’ provision implies a total
abnormal excess return for the lead-up period ranging from 6.2 percent to 12.6 percent across the
three speciﬁcations; no statistically signiﬁcant excess return is implied by being predicted to lobby
against a ‘Corporate Responsibility’ or ‘Auditor Independence’ provision.
In sum, the results of Tables IV and V support the positive view of SOX, and suggest that
investors expected the legislation to increase shareholder value. In particular, the return results
indicate that ﬁrms most aﬀected by the ‘Enhanced Disclosure’ provisions of SOX (as evidenced by
their lobbying) experienced positive abnormal excess returns during the period leading up to SOX
passage of around 10 percent relative to less aﬀected (non-lobbying) ﬁrms with similar size, book-
to-market and industry characteristics. There is little eﬀect experienced by ﬁrms most aﬀected by
the ‘Corporate Responsibility’ and ‘Auditor Independence’ rules.
D. Returns During the Period Following Passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
From Figure 2, it is apparent that ﬁrms lobbying against one or more of the SOX ‘Enhanced Dis-
closure’ rules had returns during the post-SOX period that were fairly similar to those of their
matched comparison group of non-lobbying ﬁrms. Tables IV and V conﬁrm this result. Columns
(2)-(3), (5)-(6) and (8)-(9) of Table IV Panel A estimate the portfolio level excess return regressions
on the full period from week 7 of 2002 to the end of 2004, with separate intercepts (α’s) for the
leadup period and the post-passage period, while Panel B presents similar analysis for predicted
lobbyers relative to matched non-lobbyers. In the top part of the panel, which concerns ‘Enhanced
Disclosure,’ the intercept for the post-passage period, alphaPost, is consistently close to zero in
both economic and statistical terms. Similar results obtain in columns (4)-(6) of Table V Panels A
(lobbyers) and B (predicted lobbyers) at the ﬁrm-level in the post-passage period: the γ1 regres-
26sion coeﬃcient of the dummy variable equal to one for ﬁrms that lobbied against an ‘Enhanced
Disclosure’ rule is close to zero. These ﬁndings indicate that the returns for ﬁrms that lobbied (or
were predicted to lobby) against an ‘Enhanced Disclosure’ rule were similar to the returns for their
non-lobbying comparison group of ﬁrms, and thus that the increase in (relative) stock prices expe-
rienced by lobbying ﬁrms (or predicted lobbyers) did not tend to reverse during the post-passage
period, suggesting that the positive expectation of shareholders evidenced by thier letters to the
SEC and by returns in the pre-passage period were warranted.
E. Section 404: Assessment of Internal Controls
Among the most controversial and most discussed elements of SOX is Section 404 of the Act,
which deals with management assessment of internal controls. Section 404 is a component of Title
IV of the Act, and thus is part of the ‘Enhanced Disclosure’ rules in our analysis. Since our
research design allows us to examine shareholders’ reactions to individual elements of SOX, it is
a worthwhile exercise to ask whether the results presented above are robust to focusing on this
particular provision alone. To do so, we repeat the analysis above, limiting our group of lobbying
ﬁrms to those that lobbied speciﬁcally against the rules related to Section 404.
The results, presented in graphic form in Figure 4, are striking. Firms that lobby against rules
related to Section 404 speciﬁcally experience an abnormal excess return over the 24 weeks leading
up to the passage of the Act of similar magnitude to that evidenced when we considered all ﬁrms
that lobby against any of the ‘Enhanced Disclosure’ rules. Once again, these excess returns appear
to end almost exactly around the passage of SOX, and do not revert away in the post period.
The results in Figure 4 suggest that investors believed that Section 404 speciﬁcally would
increase shareholder value, and support the arguments presented in Coates (2006), who suggests
that the enhanced disclosure related to Section 404 was one of the most important elements of the
Act.22
IV. Interpretation and Discussion
A. Mechanism
The results from our analysis in the previous section suggest that that shareholder’s perceptions of
SOX were positive, and that these perceptions were reﬂected in the relative returns of more and less
22A ﬁrm-level analysis with two separate indicator variables for lobbying against Section 404-related rules and
against other ‘Enhanced Disclosure’ rules reveals roughly equal impact for the two sets of rules.
27aﬀected ﬁrms. What then are the mechanisms through which SOX might be expected to increase
shareholder value?
There are three primary channels through which SOX may aﬀect shareholder value. First, SOX
may directly improve the operating performance of the ﬁrm through the elimination of management
ineptness, complacency or the improvement of operations as a result of lessons learned during the
internal control review. Second, SOX may improve operating performance through the elimination
of actual stealing or perquisite consumption on the part of managers who are now subject to greater
disclosure and transparency. Third, SOX may lead to an increase in shareholder conﬁdence that is
reﬂected in a lower cost of capital.
Evaluating these mechanisms is diﬃcult. There is no clear manner in which to ascertain if SOX
has eﬀectively lowered the discount rate used by shareholders. We can attempt to evaluate the
change in operating performance of lobbying ﬁrms relative to matched non-lobbyers comparing the
pre-SOX and post-SOX periods. In unreported results, we measure changes in operating perfor-
mance as (Operating income in 2004-Operating income in 2001)/(Market value of equity at the end
of week 6 of 2002), where operating income is COMPUSTAT Item 13 (operating income before de-
preciation). We then run ﬁrm level regressions with one observation per ﬁrm and with controls for
size portfolio dummies, size and book-to-market portfolio dummies, or size and industry portfolio
dummies. The estimates from our models suggest that ﬁrms that lobbied against an ’Enhanced
Disclosure’ rule experience an improvement in operating income relative to initial market value of
equity of about 5 percentage points, and this eﬀect is statistically signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level.
When we repeat the same regressions substituting predicted lobbyers for actual lobbyers, we ﬁnd
similar results, though the magnitudes are sensitive to the type of controls included.
These results, on the one hand, provide some reassurance that our return results are consistent
with changes in proﬁtability, but they are not a valid test of the mechanism through which SOX
may have aﬀected shareholder value. Our results in the previous section indicate that proﬁtability
is a strong predictor of lobbying, thus inducing an endogeneity problem in any test that attempts
to determine whether lobbying ﬁrms (or predicted lobbyers) have improved operating performance
over the period in question. In this sense, analyzing operating performance is useful only in that
ﬁnding a decrease in the performance of lobbyers relative to non-lobbyers would tend to rule out
operating performance as the mechanism through which SOX aﬀected returns. Finding and increase
in operating performance does not provide a clean test suggesting operating performance is the
28mechanism, however, due to the endogeneity problem.
As discussed in Section II, we are able to address this endogeneity concern in our returns analysis
above. Reverse causality in our setting would imply that there should be no signiﬁcant diﬀerential in
the excess returns of lobbying groups over and above similar non-lobbyers when comparing the pre-
and post-passage periods. However, as we demonstrate, a signiﬁcant diﬀerential of approximately
7% exists in the pre- and post-passage excess returns of lobbyers. This return diﬀerential suggests
that being more aﬀected by SOX leads to excess returns, rather than it simply being simply the
case that better (or worse) performing ﬁrms tend to lobby, without necessarily being more aﬀected
by the legislation. We cannot use a similar approach to examine changes in operating performance
for lobbying and non-lobbying groups in a causal fashion. While return data is available on a weekly
basis, operating performance is only available to us on an annual basis, and thus does not allows
us to examine whether there is a kink in performance around the date of SOX passage.
A second useful exercise is to attempt to ascertain the extent to which investor conﬁdence
has improved since passage of SOX. UBS/Gallup conducts an Index of Investor Optimism Poll,
which provides an indication of investor conﬁdence over the period spanning the passage and
implementation of SOX. In May 2002, 60% of respondents to the poll indicated that questionable
accounting practices in business hurt the investment climate in the U.S. “a lot.” By May 2006, that
percentage had dropped to 39%. Causal interpretation of such survey evidence is, however, not
possible.
B. Costs and Beneﬁts to Shareholders
Following the passage of SOX, a heated debate has emerged about the high costs of complying with
the ’Enhanced Disclosure’ provisions of SOX, notably Section 404’s assessment of internal controls.
It is widely acknowledged that the compliance costs associated with SOX have been higher than
initially expected. In June 2003, the SEC estimated the aggregate cost of implementing Section
404 alone on all registrants at approximately $1.24 billion, or $91,000 per registrant. In January
2004, Financial Executives International (FEI) completed the ﬁrst of a string of surveys estimating
the cost of SOX, and Section 404 in particular. The survey placed the expected average total cost
of SOX compliance at approximately $1.93 million per company. Expected costs appeared to be
increasing in ﬁrm size, with expected total compliance costs for larger ﬁrms (over $5 billion in
annual revenues) to reach $4.6 million per company. A ﬁrst follow-on survey by FEI in June 2004
raised these estimates to $3.15 million and $8 million per company, respectively. A second follow-on
29survey by FEI in March of 2005 raised the estimates to $4.36 million and $10 million, respectively.
How do these costs aﬀect our analysis of the post-passage period? We note ﬁrst that if compli-
ance costs increased equally for all ﬁrms (as a fraction of market value), then our analysis of excess
returns of lobbyers over lobbyers will be unaﬀected by the increase. This is an obvious shortcoming
of a research design which compares more aﬀected ﬁrms to less aﬀected ﬁrms, without having a
comparable group of ﬁrms unaﬀected by the legislation studied. We can only say that considering
the full period from when serious discussions about the legislation ﬁrst started in week 7 of 2002
to the end of 2004 (well into the implementation phase of SOX), the stocks more aﬀected ﬁrms
(identiﬁed as lobbying ﬁrms) outperformed those of less aﬀected ﬁrms (identiﬁed as non-lobbying
ﬁrms). Based on our returns analysis alone, we cannot unambiguously say that the net beneﬁt of
SOX for either group is positive.
What then can be said about the net beneﬁt of SOX for shareholders of lobbying and/or non-
lobbying ﬁrms? Our analysis of comment letters from investors and investor groups indicates that
shareholders expected SOX to be value increasing on average across publicly traded ﬁrms. To our
knowledge, shareholder support for SOX has not diminished since the period covered by the letters
we analyze. For example, at the SEC’s “Roundtable Discussion on Second-Year Experiences with
Internal Control Reporting and Auditing Provisions” held on May 10, 2006, institutional investors
expressed continued support for SOX, speciﬁcally for the section 404 on internal controls. In her
statement dated March 1st, Ann Yerger from the Council of Institutional Investors (an association
of more than 130 corporate, union, and public pensions plans with more the $3 trillion in assets)
wrote: “...the Council believes the beneﬁts over time will far outweigh the costs and will be a
positive for all involved in the U.S. capital markets. ... In closing, Section 404 is working.”
Furthermore, based on our return results, and drawing on the survey evidence on SOX compli-
ance costs, it can be argued more formally that the net beneﬁt of SOX were positive for shareholders
of lobbying ﬁrms. Assume that compliance costs are similar for lobbying and non-lobbying ﬁrms.23
Assume in addition that there was no gross beneﬁt of SOX for lobbying ﬁrms (again, a conservative
assumption). Under these two assumptions, the cumulative abnormal excess return of about 10
percent for ﬁrms lobbying against an ‘Enhanced Disclosure’ rule relative to their matched non-
lobbying ﬁrms then implies that the gross beneﬁt of SOX for these lobbying ﬁrms was about 10
percent of their initial market value, or approximately $329 billion in total. It is unlikely that the
23This is likely to be a conservative assumption, as analysis of audit fees pre- and post-SOX indicates that fees rose
more (relative to ﬁrm size) for lobbying ﬁrms than for non-lobbying ﬁrms over the period from 2001 to 2004.
30present value of SOX compliance costs for lobbying ﬁrms is as high as 10 percent of these ﬁrms
initial market value. From Table II Panel A, the mean market value for ﬁrms lobbying against
an ‘Enhanced Disclosure’ rule is $16.8 billion, while the median is $2.7 billion. We can compute
the average SOX compliance cost for lobbying ﬁrms, using compliance costs estimates from the
FEI 2006 survey, which breaks costs down by sales volume. This average cost is a little under $5
million per ﬁrm. Using a discount rate of 10 percent, the present value of the average lobbying
ﬁrm’s compliance costs is then $50 million. This corresponds to 0.3 percent of the mean market
value of $16.8 billion and 1.9 percent of the median market value of $2.7 billion.
This admittedly simpliﬁed calculation suggests that, at least for the set of ﬁrms lobbying against
an ‘Enhanced Disclosure’ rule, SOX was a net beneﬁt of between 8.1 and 9.7 percent of initial market
value. We have data for 196 such ﬁrms with a total market value of 196 × $16.8 billion or a little
under $3.3 trillion. At a net beneﬁt of 8.1 percent of market value, the total net beneﬁt of SOX
for these lobbying ﬁrms comes to $266 billion. At a net beneﬁt of 9.7 percent of market value, the
total net beneﬁt of SOX for these lobbying ﬁrms comes to $319 billion.
We can also go one step further, and attempt to estimate the net beneﬁt of SOX for shareholders
of all those companies publicly traded as of the beginning of our event period. Under the conser-
vative assumption that there was no (gross) beneﬁt of SOX for non-lobbyers, the total beneﬁt to
shareholders from SOX is the gross beneﬁt of SOX for lobbying ﬁrms, approximately $329 billion in
total. Based on compliance cost numbers by ﬁrm sales reported by the March 2006 FEI survey, the
total estimated annual compliance costs for the full set of US publicly traded ﬁrms is approximately
$14 billion.24 At a discount rate of 10 percent, the present value of these costs is $140 billion; at a
discount rate of 5 percent, the present value of these costs would be $280 billion, still considerably
less than the approximate gross beneﬁt of $329B to lobbyers alone.25 This suggests that with even
a small positive gross beneﬁt of SOX for non-lobbyers, the net beneﬁt of SOX for the overall US
stock market could be substantial.
24To calculate the total estimated annual compliance costs for publicly traded ﬁrms, we assign each ﬁrm the
compliance cost number associated with FEI sales category its sales fall into in 2001. To estimate sales for ﬁrms
with no sales data, we regress ﬁrm sales on the natural log of market capitalization and its square for ﬁrms that do
have sales data. We then use the resulting regression estimates to predict sales for those ﬁrms with no sales data,
and assign them the FEI compliance cost for their sales category based on their predicted sales. We then sum the
compliance costs across ﬁrms.
25Some lobbying groups, in particular AeA (formerly the American Electronics Association), using their own
internal estimates in addition to FEI data, suggest that total annual compliance costs for SOX will be higher, or
approximately $29-$35B. These groups tend to build these estimates using a per-ﬁrm cost estimate taken as the FEI
estimate for large ﬁrms, rather than assigning each ﬁrm the cost estimate appropriate to its size and sales volume.
Even at an annual cost estimate of $30B, the present value of the costs at a discount rate of 10% would still be
roughly similar to the gross beneﬁts for lobbying ﬁrms.
31Interpretation of these numbers, however, must be nuanced. Our calculations cannot account
for loss of shareholder welfare due to the decisions of some previously public companies to delist
due to the burdens of SOX regulation; nor can it account for any welfare loss resulting from the
decisions of private companies to remain private or to go public on non-US exchanges (Zingales
(2006)). In addition, we cannot rule out that insiders lost an amount equal to or greater than what
outside investors gained. Additionally, it is important to note that the lobbying ﬁrms in our sample
are predominantly large, established organizations, and thus our returns analysis does not provide
speciﬁc conclusions as to the eﬀect of SOX on smaller ﬁrms.
V. Conclusion
In this paper, we evaluate the impact of SOX on shareholders by analyzing the SOX-related lobbying
behavior of corporations, individuals and organizations. We classify the rules on which the SEC
solicited comments into three major categories: those related to ‘Enhanced Disclosure’, those related
to ‘Corporate Responsibility’, and those related to ‘Auditor Independence’. We then examine the
comment letters sent to the SEC during the drafting of the ﬁnal SOX rules.
We document that individual investors, as well as large investor groups such as pension funds
and labor unions, were overwhelmingly in favor of the SOX provisions they commented on, speaking
to shareholders’ perceived value of the legislation. In contrast, our reading of letters to the SEC
by corporate insiders reveals that an overwhelming majority of insiders in lobbying companies
opposed the SOX provision they commented on. We then use lobbying by corporate insiders to
distinguish between two views of SOX: the view that SOX improves governance and disclosure, and
the view that SOX will not be beneﬁcial due to high compliance costs outweighing any potential
beneﬁts. Our identifying assumption is that insiders in companies more aﬀected by SOX (positively
or negatively) were more likely to lobby.
Our study of returns reveals that during the 24-week period leading up to passage of SOX, re-
turns were higher for corporations whose insiders lobbied against an ‘Enhanced Disclosure’ provision
of SOX than for non-lobbying ﬁrms with similar size, book-to-market and industry characteristics.
This lends support to the improved disclosure and governance hypothesis and suggests that cor-
porate insiders lobbied to water down the implementation of SOX because SOX reduces insiders’
ability to expropriate company resources. Cumulative returns were approximately 10 percent higher
for corporations whose insiders lobbied against one or more of the SOX ‘Enhanced Disclosure’ pro-
32visions than for non-lobbying ﬁrms with similar size, book-to-market and industry characteristics.
There is no evidence of diﬀerential returns between lobbyers and non-lobbyers in the post-passage
period.
In sum, our ﬁndings suggest that investors had overwhelmingly positive expectations about
the eﬀects of SOX. These expectations appear to be warranted in the case of the ’Enhanced Dis-
closure’ provisions of SOX, though not in the case of the ’Corporate Responsibility’ or ’Auditor
Independence’ provisions.
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Characteristics of Publicly Traded Firms that Did and Did not Lobby the SEC
This table presents ﬁrm characteristics for companies who did and did not lobby against the proposed SOX-related SEC
rule releases. Panel A examines the characteristics of both lobbying and non-lobbying companies with regards to the rules on
Enhanced Financial Disclosure and the PCAOB proposed and implemented by the SEC. Panel B examines the characteristics of
both lobbying and non-lobbying companies with regards to the corporate responsibility rules proposed and implemented by the
SEC. Panel C examines the characteristics of both lobbying and non-lobbying companies with regards to Auditor Independence
rules proposed and implemented by the SEC. We present the mean, standard deviation and the p-value for a t-test for no
diﬀerences in means between lobbyers and non-lobbyers. Firm market capitalization is expressed in MM $ and calculated for
the end of week 6 of 2002 (Friday, February 8th). Book-to-market equity is calculated using book equity for the ﬁscal year
ending in 2001 and market equity for the end of week 6 of 2002; this variable is winsorized at the top 2 and bottom 2 percentiles.
Total assets (COMPUSTAT item 6) is expressed in MM $ and is calculated in year 2001. Number of years the ﬁrm has been
public is the number of years the ﬁrm has been publicly traded as of 2002; we cap this variable at 30, because ﬁrms traded
in NASDAQ are covered in CRSP only since 1972. Net Income (COMPUSTAT item 172) over sales (COMPUSTAT item
12) is calculated as of year 2000; we use 2000 (as opposed to 2001) since 2001 income may only be disclosed in early 2002
and could thus directly aﬀect returns; this variable is winsorized at the top 2 and bottom 2 percentiles. Governance Index
is the ﬁrm’s Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003) index calculated in year 2000. PAC is an indicator variable equal to one if
the ﬁrm has a Political Action Committee that was registered with the Federal Election Commission’s during the 1999-2000
period. Past Lobbying on Compensation Rules is an indicator variable equal to one if the ﬁrm has lobbied against the 1992
revision of executive compensation disclosure rules adopted by the SEC (See Lo, 2003). Past Lobbying on Proxy Rules is an
indicator variable equal to one if the ﬁrm has lobbied against the new rules on proxy ﬁghts adopted by the SEC in 1992 (See
Lo, 2003). Fraction of shares outstanding owned by institutions is calculated for the year 2001 based on Thompson Financial’s
CDA/Spectrum Institutional (13f) Holdings. Number of business segments is calculated using the COMPUSTAT Segments
data for year 2001. Number of geographical segments is calculated using the COMPUSTAT Segments data for year 2001.
Fraction of shares outstanding owned by executives is calculated including all the shared owned by the executives (generally
the top 5) included in Execucomp for year 2001. Audit fees are expressed in MM $ and calculated in year 2001. Finally, the

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Predictability of Lobbying by Corporate Insiders
The table presents the results of probit analysis of the likelihood of a company lobbying against SOX-related SEC rule
releases. In columns (1),(2), and (3) the dependent variable is an indicator taking the value of one if the ﬁrm lobbied against
one or more of the rules on Enhanced Financial Disclosure and PCAOB proposed and implemented by the SEC, and zero
otherwise. In columns (4),(5), and (6) the dependent variable is an indicator taking the value of one if the ﬁrm lobbied against
one or more of the rules on Corporate Responsibility proposed and implemented by the SEC, and zero otherwise. In columns
(7), (8), and (9) the dependent variable is an indicator taking the value of one if the ﬁrm lobbied against one or more of the
rules Auditors Independence proposed and implemented by the SEC, and zero otherwise. In Log of Market Capitalization is
calculated at the end of week 6 of 2002 (Friday, February 8th). Book-to-Market Ratio is calculated using book equity for the
ﬁscal year ending in 2001 and market equity for the end of week 6 of 2002 (Friday, February 8th). Total assets (COMPUSTAT
item 6) is expressed in MM $ and it is calculated at the end of 2001. Number of years the ﬁrm has been public is the number of
years the ﬁrm has been publicly traded as of 2002; we cap this variable at 30, because ﬁrms traded in NASDAQ are covered in
CRSP only since 1972. Net Income (COMPUSTAT item 172) over sales (COMPUSTAT item 12) is calculated as of year 2000;
we use 2000 (as opposed to 2001) since 2001 income may only be disclosed in early 2002 and could thus directly aﬀect returns;
this variable is winsorized at the top 2 and bottom 2 percentiles. Governance Index is the ﬁrm’s Gompers, Ishii and Metrick
(2003) index calculated in year 2000 (Higher values of the governance index indicate more entrenched management and lower
shareholder power). PAC is an indicator variable equal to one if the ﬁrm has a Political Action Committee that was registered
with the Federal Election Commission’s during the 1999-2000 period; Past Lobbying on Compensation Rules is an indicator
variable equal to one if the ﬁrm has lobbied against the 1992 revision of executive compensation disclosure rules adopted by
the SEC (see Lo, 2003). Past Lobbying on Proxy Rules is an indicator variable equal to one if the ﬁrm has lobbied against the
new rules on proxy ﬁghts adopted by the SEC in 1992 (see Lo, 2003). Fraction of shares outstanding owned by institutions is
calculated in year 2001 using Thompson Financial’s CDA/Spectrum Institutional (13f) Holdings. Number of business segments
is calculated using the COMPUSTAT Segments data for year 2001. Number of geographical segments is calculated using the
COMPUSTAT Segments data for year 2001. Fraction of shares outstanding owned by executives is calculated including all
the shared owned by the executives (generally the top 5) included in Execucomp for year 2001. The logarithm of the ﬁrm’s
audit fees (expressed in MM $) is calculated in year 2001. Finally, all the regressions include indicator variables for Standard































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Portfolio Analysis: Abnormal Excess Returns During Period Leading Up to Passage
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and the Period from Passage to the End of 2004
The table presents the abnormal excess returns for ﬁrms that lobbied against SOX related rules relative to non-lobbying
ﬁrms. Panel A reports results for weekly excess returns averaged across lobbying ﬁrms. Panel B reports results for weekly
excess returns averaged across ﬁrms that are predicted to lobby based on the results of Table III. The ﬁrst section of the tables
presents the results for ﬁrms that lobbied against enhanced ﬁnancial disclosure and PCAOB rules; the second section of the
tables presents the results for ﬁrms that lobbied against corporate responsibility rules; the third section of the tables presents
the results for ﬁrms that lobbied against auditor independence rules. Excess returns are calculated for each lobbying ﬁrm by
subtracting the return on a portfolio of non-lobbying ﬁrms of similar size (columns (1)-(3)) or of similar size and book-to-market
equity (columns (4)-(6)) or of similar size and in the same 1-digit industry category (columns (7)-(9)). Excess returns are then
averaged for each week across the set of lobbying ﬁrms. These average excess returns are then regressed either just on a constant
or on a constant and the three market, size and book-to-market factors. This is done ﬁrst for the 24-week period from week
7 to 30 of 2002 leading up to passage of SOX only (columns (1), (4) and (7)) and then for the period starting with week 7 of
2002 and ending in the last week of 2004 (columns (2)-(3), (5)-(6), and (8)-(9)) with diﬀerent constant terms allowed for the
lead-up period and for the post-SOX period.
47Panel A: Lobbyers versus Non-Lobbyers
Dependent variable: rLobbying Firm Group
t − rMatched Non-Lobbying Firm Group
t
Comparison Group Comparison Group Comparison Group
Based On 100 Size Based On 25 Size And Based On 25 Size And
Portfolios 5 Book-To-Market 10 1-Digit Industry
Portfolios Portfolios
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Enhanced Financial Disclosure and PCAOB
αLead-Up 0.0051*** 0.0051*** 0.0049*** 0.0042*** 0.0042*** 0.0040*** 0.0033*** 0.0033*** 0.0035***
(0.0013) (0.0013) (0.0015) (0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0013) (0.0010) (0.0009) (0.0011)
αPost 0.0002 0.0005 0.0000 0.0006 0.0003 0.0004
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0003)
βMarket -0.0425* -0.0823*** 0.0045
(0.0233) (0.0206) (0.0188)
βSMB -0.1143*** -0.1161*** -0.0710**
(0.0358) (0.0339) (0.0290)
βHML 0.0401 -0.0780 0.0204
(0.0486) (0.0477) (0.0367)
N (Weeks) 24 151 151 24 151 151 24 151 151
R2 0.406 0.144 0.259 0.356 0.103 0.295 0.343 0.108 0.154
Corporate Responsibility
αLead-Up 0.0021 0.0021 0.0033 0.0020 0.0020 0.0032* 0.0022 0.0022 0.0036*
(0.0020) (0.0020) (0.0021) (0.0018) (0.0018) (0.0018) (0.0018) (0.0018) (0.0018)
αPost -0.0005 -0.0004 -0.0010 -0.0005 -0.0008 -0.0006
(0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006)
βMarket 0.0683** -0.0014 0.0694**
(0.0321) (0.0295) (0.0289)
βSMB -0.2117*** -0.1935*** -0.2054***
(0.0504) (0.0471) (0.0498)
βHML -0.0017 -0.2056*** -0.0674
(0.0841) (0.0771) (0.0759)
N (Weeks) 24 151 151 24 151 151 24 151 151
R2 0.046 0.017 0.166 0.050 0.026 0.218 0.059 0.023 0.198
Auditor Independence
αLead-Up 0.0035* 0.0035* 0.0045** 0.0032 0.0032 0.0048** 0.0027 0.0027 0.0031
(0.0019) (0.0019) (0.0022) (0.0020) (0.0019) (0.0020) (0.0018) (0.0018) (0.0021)
αPost 0.0259 0.0303 -0.0024
(0.0324) (0.0330) (0.0319)
βMarket -0.1995*** -0.1980*** -0.1906***
(0.0552) (0.0503) (0.0568)
βSMB -0.0676 -0.2253*** 0.0087
(0.0784) (0.0833) (0.0674)
βHML -0.0002 0.0001 -0.0007 -0.0003 -0.0001 0.0002
(0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0008) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007)
N (Weeks) 24 151 151 24 151 151 24 151 151
R2 0.126 0.028 0.130 0.101 0.026 0.193 0.089 0.017 0.099
48Panel B: Firms Predicted to Lobby versus Non-Lobbyers
Dependent variable: rPredicted to Lobby Firm Group
t − rMatched Non-Lobbying Firm Group
t
Comparison Group Comparison Group Comparison Group
Based On 100 Size Based On 25 Size And Based On 25 Size And
Portfolios 5 Book-To-Market 10 1-Digit Industry
Portfolios Portfolios
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Enhanced Financial Disclosure and PCAOB
αLead-Up 0.0044* 0.0044* 0.0050* 0.0049** 0.0049** 0.0060** 0.0027 0.0027* 0.0037**
(0.0024) (0.0023) (0.0026) (0.0023) (0.0023) (0.0024) (0.0016) (0.0016) (0.0016)
αPost -0.0001 0.0002 -0.0003 0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0001
(0.0006) (0.0005) (0.0007) (0.0006) (0.0005) (0.0005)
βMarket 0.0296 0.0006 0.0732***
(0.0296) (0.0357) (0.0240)
βSMB -0.3162*** -0.3038*** -0.2236***
(0.0538) (0.0515) (0.0386)
βHML 0.1441 -0.0993 0.0850
(0.0903) (0.0969) (0.0645)
N (Weeks) 24 151 151 24 151 151 24 151 151
R2 0.128 0.045 0.285 0.164 0.053 0.268 0.109 0.031 0.265
Corporate Responsibility
αLead-Up -0.0005 -0.0005 0.0014 0.0020 0.0020 0.0032* 0.0022 0.0022 0.0036*
(0.0027) (0.0027) (0.0027) (0.0018) (0.0018) (0.0018) (0.0018) (0.0018) (0.0018)
αPost 0.0007 0.0005 -0.0010 -0.0005 -0.0008 -0.0006
(0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006)
βMarket 0.1534*** -0.0014 0.0694**
(0.0437) (0.0295) (0.0289)
βSMB -0.3118*** -0.1935*** -0.2054***
(0.0529) (0.0471) (0.0498)
βHML 0.1019 -0.2056*** -0.0674
(0.1125) (0.0771) (0.0759)
N (Weeks) 24 151 151 24 151 151 24 151 151
R2 0.001 0.005 0.259 0.050 0.026 0.218 0.059 0.023 0.198
Auditor Independence
αLead-Up 0.0033* 0.0033* 0.0048** 0.0029 0.0029* 0.0047** 0.0025 0.0025 0.0035**
(0.0018) (0.0017) (0.0019) (0.0018) (0.0017) (0.0021) (0.0017) (0.0017) (0.0018)
αPost -0.0001 -0.0005 -0.0002 -0.0004 -0.0001 -0.0004
(0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0005)
βMarket 0.1639*** 0.1383*** 0.1339***
(0.0321) (0.0338) (0.0291)
βSMB -0.1991*** -0.1715*** -0.2311***
(0.0425) (0.0450) (0.0398)
βHML 0.1674*** -0.0071 0.2445***
(0.0612) (0.0684) (0.0612)
N (Weeks) 24 151 151 24 151 151 24 151 151
R2 0.135 0.032 0.304 0.105 0.025 0.247 0.082 0.019 0.316
49Table V:
Firm Level Analysis:
Abnormal Excess Returns During Period Leading Up to Passage of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and the Period from Passage to the End of 2004
This table reports results for the excess returns at the ﬁrm level. In the ﬁrst three columns the dependent variable is the
sum of each ﬁrm’s excess return minus the riskless rate during the lead-up period, while in the last three columns it is the
sum of each ﬁrm’s excess return minus the riskless rate during the post-SOX period. In Panel A Lobbied Against Enhanced
Financial Disclosure and PCAOB Rules is an indicator variable equal to one if the ﬁrm lobbied against the SEC rules related
to SOX Section IV; Lobbied Against Corporate Responsibility Rules is an indicator variable equal to one if the ﬁrm lobbied
against the SEC rules related to SOX Section III; Lobbied Against Auditors Independence Rules is an indicator variable equal
to one if the ﬁrm lobbied against the SEC rules related to SOX Section IV. In Panel B Predicted to Lobby Against Enhanced
Financial Disclosure and PCAOB Rules is an indicator variable equal to one if the ﬁrm was predicted to lobby against the SEC
rules related to SOX Section IV, based on our probit model of Table III; Predicted to Lobby Against Corporate Responsibility
Rules is an indicator variable equal to one if the ﬁrm was predicted to lobby against the SEC rules related to SOX Section
III, based on our probit model; Predicted to Lobby Against Auditors Independence Rules is an indicator variable equal to one
if the ﬁrm was predicted to lobby against the SEC rules related to SOX Section IV by our probit analysis. Dummies for size
(100 Size dummies) are indicator variables for each size portfolio. Dummies for size and book to market are indicator variables
for 25 size portfolios and 5 book-to-market categories. Since the ﬁrms in our sample are very large, we deﬁned the cutoﬀ for
size to include enough observations in each group (the size ranges are 7 percentiles wide up to the 70th percentile, and then 2
percentiles wide). Dummies for size and industry are indicator variables for 25 size portfolios and 10 industry classiﬁcations.
To create these indicators we deﬁned the cutoﬀ for size to include enough observations in each group (the size ranges are 7
percentiles wide up to the 70th percentile, and then 2 percentiles wide).
Panel A:
Cumulative weekly excess Cumulative weekly excess
return minus the riskless rate return minus the riskless rate
during the leadup period during the post period
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Lobbied Against Enhanced Finan- 0.1315*** 0.1070*** 0.0864** 0.0401 0.0248 0.0567
cial Disclosure and PCAOB Rules (0.0353) (0.0369) (0.0347) (0.0649) (0.0690) (0.0649)
Lobbied Against Corporate 0.0048 0.0002 0.0104 -0.0594 -0.0478 -0.0798
Responsibility Rules (0.0481) (0.0511) (0.0471) (0.0880) (0.1003) (0.0882)
Lobbied Against Auditor 0.0401 0.0364 0.0330 -0.0356 -0.0391 -0.0096
Independence Rules (0.0834) (0.0877) (0.0817) (0.1533) (0.1652) (0.1532)
Constant -0.1560*** -0.1634*** -0.1549*** 0.7557*** 0.7991*** 0.7554***
(0.0054) (0.0058) (0.0052) (0.0101) (0.0112) (0.0100)
Dummies for size (100 Size dummies) YES NO NO YES NO NO
Dummies for size and book to market NO YES NO NO YES NO
Dummies for size and industry NO NO YES NO NO YES
Observations 7250 6381 7250 6913 5914 6913
R-squared 0.032 0.076 0.112 0.057 0.067 0.096
50Panel B:
Cumulative weekly excess Cumulative weekly excess
return minus the riskless rate return minus the riskless rate
during the leadup period during the post period
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Predicted to Lobby Against Enhanced Finan- 0.1258*** 0.1215** 0.0623 -0.0513 -0.0629 -0.0195
cial Disclosure and PCAOB Rules (0.0468) (0.0483) (0.0486) (0.0874) (0.0932) (0.0921)
Predicted to Lobby Against Corporate -0.0190 -0.0114 -0.0007 0.0717 0.0983 0.0169
Responsibility Rules (0.0362) (0.0410) (0.0359) (0.0663) (0.0821) (0.0670)
Predicted to Lobby Against Auditor 0.0626 0.0542 0.0419 -0.0373 -0.0672 -0.0266
Independence Rules (0.0430) (0.0448) (0.0434) (0.0805) (0.0851) (0.0830)
Constant -0.1567*** -0.1650*** -0.1550*** 0.7562*** 0.8002*** 0.7566***
(0.0055) (0.0060) (0.0053) (0.0103) (0.0116) (0.0102)
Dummies for size (100 Size dummies) YES NO NO YES NO NO
Dummies for size and book to market NO YES NO NO YES NO
Dummies for Size and Industry NO NO YES NO NO YES
Observations 7250 6381 7250 6913 5914 6913























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































56Figure 1. Cumulative Excess Returns around Date of Filing Lobbying Letter with
Negative Opinion
The ﬁgures show the cumulative excess returns for companies who lobby the SEC around the date of SEC receipt of the
lobbying letter. Results are shown separately for ﬁrms lobbying against one of the SOX enhanced disclosure rules, corporate
responsibility rules, and auditor independence rules, and are based exclusively on letters expressing negative opinions about
the particular rule. In each graph, results are shown for two diﬀerent deﬁnitions of excess returns. The lines labelled “No
factor adjustment” are based on excess returns deﬁned as (return on lobbying ﬁrm stock)-(return on a size-matched comparison
group). The lines labelled “With factor adjustment” are based on excess returns deﬁned as the residual from a regression (run
on weekly data from week 31 of 2002 to the end of 2004) of (return on lobbying ﬁrm stock)-(return on size-matched comparison
group) on a constant, the excess return on the market, and Fama and French’s the size and book-to-market factors SMB and
HML. For each approach excess returns are averaged across lobbying ﬁrms for each week in event time, and then summed over
time, starting 10 weeks before the week of the letter and ending 20 weeks after the week of the letter. Results are based only
on letters ﬁled at least 10 weeks after the passage of SOX on 7/30/2002 so that no point in the ﬁgures overlap with the period
leading up to passage of SOX.
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 Figure 2. Cumulative Excess Returns during Years 2002-2004 for Publicly Traded
Firms that Lobbied the SEC
The ﬁgure shows the cumulative excess returns of ﬁrms lobbying ﬁrms against one or more of the ‘Enhanced Disclosure’
provisions of SOX over and above their matched comparison groups starting in week 7 of 2002. Three sets of cumulative excess
returns are shown. Panel A is based on a size-matched (100 size portfolios) control group of non-lobbying ﬁrms. Panel B is
based on a size and book-to-market equity (25 size portfolios and 5 book-to-market portfolios) matched control group. Panel
C is based on a size and industry-matched (25 size portfolios and 10 industry portfolios) control group. In each graph, two
lines are shown. The unadjusted cumulative excess return is calculated by averaging the excess returns over the comparison
group across lobbying ﬁrms in each week, and then summing these excess returns over time, starting in week 7 of year 2002.
The factor-adjusted cumulative excess return is calculated by ﬁrst regressing the excess return over the comparison group on
the excess return on the market and the Fama-French size and book-to-market factors. The regression is run using weekly data
from week 7 of 2002 until the end of 2004, and the alpha plus the residuals are averaged each week and then summed over time.
The leftmost vertical lines indicates the beginning of serious negotiations about SOX in Congress while the rightmost vertical
line indicates the week SOX was passed in Congress.
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 Figure 3. Cumulative Excess Returns during Years 2002-2004 for Publicly Traded
Firms that were Predicted to Lobby the SEC
The ﬁgure shows the cumulative excess returns of ﬁrms that were predicted to lobby the SEC against one or more of the
‘Enhanced Disclosure’ provisions of SOX according to our models, over and above their matched comparison groups starting in
week 7 of 2002. Predicted lobbyers are those ﬁrms whom our probit models place in the top 3% of ﬁrms based on likelihood of
lobbying. Three sets of cumulative excess returns are shown. Panel A is based on a size-matched (100 size portfolios) control
group of non-lobbying ﬁrms. Panel B is based on a size and book-to-market equity (25 size portfolios and 5 book-to-market
portfolios) matched control group. Panel C is based on a size and industry-matched (25 size portfolios and 10 industry portfolios)
control group. In each graph, two lines are shown. The unadjusted cumulative excess return is calculated by averaging the
excess returns over the comparison group across predicted lobbying ﬁrms in each week, and then summing these excess returns
over time, starting in week 7 of year 2002. The factor-adjusted cumulative excess return is calculated by ﬁrst regressing the
excess return over the comparison group on the excess return on the market and the Fama-French size and book-to-market
factors. The regression is run using weekly data from week 7 of 2002 until the end of 2004, and the alpha plus the residuals
are averaged each week and then summed over time. The leftmost vertical lines indicates the beginning of serious negotiations
about SOX in Congress while the rightmost vertical line indicates the week SOX was passed in Congress.
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 Figure 4. Cumulative Excess Returns during Years 2002-2004 for Publicly Traded
Firms that Lobbied the SEC (Section 404 Only)
The ﬁgure shows the cumulative excess returns of ﬁrms lobbying ﬁrms against Section 404-related provisions of SOX over
and above their matched comparison groups starting in week 7 of 2002. Three sets of cumulative excess returns are shown.
Panel A is based on a size-matched (100 size portfolios) control group of non-lobbying ﬁrms. Panel B is based on a size and
book-to-market equity (25 size portfolios and 5 book-to-market portfolios) matched control group. Panel C is based on a size
and industry-matched (25 size portfolios and 10 industry portfolios) control group. In each graph, two lines are shown. The
unadjusted cumulative excess return is calculated by averaging the excess returns over the comparison group across lobbying
ﬁrms in each week, and then summing these excess returns over time, starting in week 7 of year 2002. The factor-adjusted
cumulative excess return is calculated by ﬁrst regressing the excess return over the comparison group on the excess return on
the market and the Fama-French size and book-to-market factors. The regression is run using weekly data from week 7 of
2002 until the end of 2004, and the alpha plus the residuals are averaged each week and then summed over time. The leftmost
vertical lines indicates the beginning of serious negotiations about SOX in Congress while the rightmost vertical line indicates
the week SOX was passed in Congress.
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